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to take over and directly administer some of the functions for which the towns

had previously been responsible. State regulation grew as the state wrested
administrative authority away from the localities. But the motivation for this
transfer of authority was not a desire to expand state power; it was a desire
to avoid fiscal imposition by the towns. A more powerful state was, in a sense,
the unintended consequence of these acts of fiscal self-defense.
Versions of this story have been told before but in the majority of earli-

er accounts, the state's expanded role in poor relief has simply been ascribed to the growth of an unsettled population. Parker's account adds a
crucial political dimension to this heretofore almost entirely demographic
story. Read this way, the article contributes important insights into the processes that drove regulation of the poor upward from the towns to the state
in the nineteenth century.
Read a second way, however, the article seeks to tell a more ambitious story
of the development of American citizenship as a gesture of refusal or exclusion rather than as the unfolding of national identity. Essentially, Parker's
argument is that the same processes that led Massachusetts to defend itself
against fiscal imposition by the towns also led it to begin to defend itself
against the demands of immigrants. The great wave of immigration into

Massachusetts from the 1820s to the 1850s led to a huge increase in the
number of state paupers, and of these a growing proportion were immigrants.

The Commonwealth reacted by beginning to use citizenship as a device
for limiting the claims of immigrants to enter and remain on Massachusetts territory and to seek support from the community when they fell into
need. Massachusetts began to limit entry to its territory by enacting the
Passenger Acts. It limited the rights of immigrants to remain on its territory by invoking various provisions in its Poor Law. Immigrants who sought
poor relief could be sent back to their points of origin. These acts of refusal were accompanied by the development of a state discourse that sought
to portray immigrants as alien other in order to justify restrictions on their
territorial and welfare claims.

Parker argues that this was a new development. By contrast, during the

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, before Massachusetts had to
contend with a large immigrant population, the right to enter and remain

on Massachusetts territory had not been tied to citizenship but to town
settlement, had not been controlled by the state but by the localities. The
territorialization of the boundaries of Massachusetts was new, as was the
linkage of both territorial rights and rights of support to citizenship. And
these developments could be traced to the success the towns had earlier had

in shifting responsibility for poor relief onto the state and to the fiscal
difficulties this shift created for the state when it began to have to deal with

the effects of a large wave of immigration.
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This argument seems completely plausible, knowing what we do of the
ugly nativism that developed in Massachusetts during this period. But there
is other evidence that Parker does not discuss which suggests that his argument may exaggerate the novelty of the steps Massachusetts took in the
1830s and 1840s to deal with immigrants and the novelty of the state discourse used to justify these steps.

Massachusetts had long been concerned with the quality and character
of arriving immigrants. In the eighteenth century, the colony passed a se-

ries of laws to address these problems. And Massachusetts was not alone.
Other colonies also passed laws to deal with problems that dissolute, infirm, and aged immigrants might create and to limit the entry of certain
groups of aliens who were considered particularly undesirable. A number
of these colonial laws created bonding and fee schemes that were strikingly
similar to the ones in the Passenger Acts. The Passenger Acts seem to have
represented the culmination of an older tradition of immigration regulation
rather than the beginning of a new one. They appear to look backward rather
than forward to the harsher, more comprehensive schemes that began to

be established with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.
This evidence also suggests different motives for the late eighteenthcentury Massachusetts law that Parker discusses in his article. It indicates
that by the end of the eighteenth century there was a well-established tradition of using citizenship (subjectship) as refusal and that this older tradition found expression in the settlement act of 1794 and in the Massachusetts alien real property disability.

In a number of colonies and later states, statutes were enacted during
the eighteenth century that put into place immigration regulations similar
to the ones later adopted in the Passenger Acts.
In Massachusetts, statutes were passed, beginning in 1701, to prevent the
landing of the "poor, vicious and infirm," laws that required the master of each

vessel to post a bond that towns receiving any "lame, impotent, or infirm
persons, incapable of maintaining themselves ... would not be charged with
their support." In the absence of this security, the captain was to return such
passengers to their port of embarkation.'

This provision was renewed in 1723, 1725, and 1757. Other colonies sought
to restrict the entry of Catholics, Irish, Germans, and other aliens. In Penn-

sylvania, the immigration of a large number of Germans in 1727 created
fears that these "strangers" who were "ignorant of our Language & Laws"

1. Marilyn Baseler, "Asylum For Mankind": America, 1607-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 71-72.
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would create grave problems for the Commonwealth. In 1729, as a result,

Pennsylvania enacted a law that
levied a duty of forty shillings on "every person being an alien born out of
the allegiance of the King of Great Britain ... coming into this province by
land or water" and twenty shillings on "any Irish servant or passenger upon
redemption."2

In Maryland in the early eighteenth century the legislature passed an act
that

required the masters of vessels "or others importing Irish Servants into this
Province by Land or by Water" to pay twenty shillings sterling "per poll." The
purpose of this law, according to the act's title, was to raise "a Supply to defray

the Public Charge... and... to prevent the Importing too great a number
of Irish Papists into this Province." Similar steps were taken by Virginia's
legislature ... [w]hen in 1699 the burgesses laid a duty of fifteen shillings
on "every servant not born in England or Wales ...."3
After the Revolution,
Americans retained their colonial reluctance to serve as a regenerative haven
for Europe's failures-men who would enervate rather than strengthen the
new nation.... Postwar governments did their best to staunch the influx of
infirm and dissolute immigrants. In 1788 Massachusetts reenacted colonial
laws requiring the registration of foreigners and prohibiting the landing of
aliens who were likely to need public relief.4

From the beginning, Americans had a double-sided view of immigrants
and immigration. On the one hand, they frequently saw immigrants as a
critical source of future prosperity. On the other, they were concerned that
only the right sort of immigrants should come into the country. After the
Revolution, Massachusetts seems to have had a more restrictive immigra-

tion policy than some other states. Indeed, one Massachusetts man complained that this restrictive policy would result in the state falling economically behind other regions of the country. When, after the Revolution, a

number of states abolished the alien real property disability in order to
encourage immigration, Massachusetts did not.5 Indeed, Parker quotes from
a 1785 Massachusetts bill that sought to reaffirm in the strongest terms the
alien real property disability in the state.
After the Revolution and through the 1790s the new nation engaged in

a sweeping debate about alienage and the terms of naturalization. The

Naturalization Act of 1795 and the Alien, Sedition and Naturalization Acts
2. Ibid., 72-73.
3. Ibid., 84.
4. Ibid., 197.
5. Ibid., 212 (economic effects), 218 (alien real property disability).
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of 1798 were expressions of how deeply these issues exercised Americans
during this period.
Although most of the delegates to the Constitutional convention wished to
avoid giving "the tincture of illiberality to the Constitution," none of them
could completely shake the belief that foreigners "bring with them, not only
attachments to other countries, but ideas of government so distinct from ours,
that in every point of view they are dangerous."6

"In 1795 Federalists and Republicans agreed that foreigners needed a long-

er period of acculturation and closer scrutiny before entering America's
political arena."7 A nephew of President John Adams wrote that "the grand

cause of all our present difficulties may be traced... to so many hordes
of Foreigners imigrating [sic]to America .. ."8 But after 1795 the Republican and the Federalist Parties went separate ways and the Federalists
began to embrace an even more robust nativism. In Massachusetts, the legislature was dominated and controlled by Federalists.
Even after Jefferson was elected president in 1800, the Naturalization
Act of 1802 continued to include many provisions found in the 1795 and
1798 Federalist naturalization acts.
Any immigrant arriving after the passage of the Act of 1802 was now required
to present a certificate issued by a court clerk declaring that he had registered

as an alien prior to petitioning for naturalization. This "alien report" recorded a foreigner's name, birthplace, age, allegiance, country of origin, and intended place of settlement.... The registration of immigrants and resident
aliens was a dramatic expansion of the power of government to intrude into
the lives of America's immigrants.9

There are three things that should be said about the Massachusetts Pas-

senger Acts of the 1830s and 1840s and the discourse that was deployed
to justify them. First, in their concern for the fiscal burdens that immigrants

might impose on the Commonwealth and in the mechanisms they established to try to address this problem, they seem to have been completely

traditional, harking back to schemes that had been used in various colonies since the eighteenth century.
Second, the state discourse about the alien, corrupt character of foreigners that was used to justify the treatment of aliens during the 1830s and
1840s does not seem to have been substantially different from discourses
that had been used intermittently for over a century in connection with
efforts to limit the immigration of Irish Papists, Germans, Jews, or post-

French Revolutionary radicals. The precise character of the concerns ex6. Ibid., 234.
7. Ibid., 267.

8. Quoted in ibid., 270. Emphasis in original.
9. Ibid., 309.
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pressed about foreigners in the nineteenth century may have been somewhat different than the character of the concerns expressed in the eighteenth
century, but over this period there was remarkable continuity in the impulse
to portray the alien foreigner as other and to try to limit the immigration
of certain groups on that ground.
Third, the Passenger Acts do not seem to have been direct precursors of
the harsher form of immigration regulation that began to be put into place
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They did not refuse immigrants entry into Massachusetts territory outright but conditioned entry
upon the payment of a significant, but not prohibitive, $2 fee in many cases, or upon the posting of a $1000 bond in the case of the aged and infirm.
This was a weak form of territorialization and a far cry from the modem
regime of immigration, which took its final form during the 1920s. That
regime flatly excluded (excludes) most immigrants from the country un-

less they could (can) specially qualify under the law.
Parker acknowledges that the Passenger Acts did not actually refuse
immigrants entry into Massachusetts and represented only a weak form of

territorialization but goes on to point out that Massachusetts did refuse
immigrants rights to remain on its territory under Poor Law. And this is
unquestionably true. Immigrants without a settlement in a Massachusetts
town could be removed from the Commonwealth and sent overseas should

they seek poor relief. But this gesture of refusal of territorial rights applied

equally to immigrants and citizens. Any citizen who had not managed to

establish a settlement in a Massachusetts town could also be removed to

the place that was responsible for his support. Parker devotes several pages to describing how Massachusetts officials could, at times, work hard to
return citizen paupers to the states from which they had come and which
remained responsible for their support. One Massachusetts official, Parker writes,
assiduously visited neighboring states to investigate whether the responsibility

for some state paupers might not be pinned onto governmental bodies there.
In 1855, "to facilitate the discovery of [town] settlements of persons claiming support from the State, [this official] journeyed into Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and ... found a home for one

hundred and five [state] paupers."'0

Citizens who had not managed to acquire a town settlement also stood
upon exactly the same footing as aliens when it came to claims upon the
community for support. Both were entitled to receive interim poor relief

as Massachusetts state paupers so long as the state did not opt to remove
10. Kunal Parker, "State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants

in Antebellum Massachusetts," Law and History Review 19 (2001): 634.
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them to their places of origin. Indeed, even Massachusetts citizens could
be removed to their towns of origin.
Parker recognizes that the similarities in the treatment of citizen paupers
without settlements and alien paupers create some difficulties for his argument. His response is to urge that citizenship should be understood as a
gesture of pure refusal, one that did not entail any notion that citizenship

brought any particular advantages. But I find this argument difficult to
accept. If we say that citizenship is a gesture of refusal, it must be to establish that in some respects at least citizenship gives something that alien-

age does not. If citizenship gives no more than alienage, it is not alienage
against which the gesture of refusal operates but some other characteristic
that citizen and alien share. In this case, the main gesture of refusal seems

to have been one aimed at poor people without settlements in Massachusetts towns, regardless of whether they were citizens or aliens. In the end,
the case seems weak for seeing this particular refusal of territorial rights

under Poor Law as one based on citizenship.
Ironically, there are clear gestures of citizenship as refusal to be found

in Massachusetts Poor Law, and in Massachusetts law generally, but they
appear decades before the 1830s and 1840s. The 1794 Massachusetts Settlement Act, and the alien real property disability, which continued in effect in Massachusetts long after the Revolution, excluded aliens from important legal entitlements purely on the ground that they were not citizens.
But Parker sees these earlier gestures not as gestures of citizenship as re-

fusal but as more traditional gestures somehow not based on citizenship.
The 1794 Massachusetts settlement act, for example, explicitly prohibited aliens from acquiring a town settlement by demonstrating that they
were capable of supporting themselves. Parker argues that the statute was
written as it was only because the towns feared that aliens, who could not
own real property in Massachusetts, would pose a greater fiscal risk for

towns than American citizens. The act of refusal contained in the statute

was not anti-alien. It was simply anti a group of people who could not own
real property and hence who could not achieve the economic self-sufficien-

cy and political independence that ownership of real property was then
thought to bring.

Parker has not found direct evidence for this reading of the statute, and
in light of what we know about an older tradition of using citizenship/subjectship as a gesture of refusal and of the Massachusetts legislature's strong
Federalist, anti-immigrant posture during this period, a better reading of the
statute, I think, would cast it as a clear gesture of citizenship as refusal.

The 1794 statute continued to make the common law modes of acquiring a settlement available to aliens: marriage, serving an apprenticeship,
serving as a town officer or minister, and so forth. But, as Parker rightly
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points out, these were modes of acquiring a settlement that were not meant
for the complete outsider. Complete outsiders could acquire a town settlement under the statute by demonstrating a capacity to support themselves
over a period of time-but only if they were American citizens. American
citizens could acquire a town settlement in Massachusetts by demonstrating economic capacity in one of three ways: (1) through ownership of real
property of a certain value for three years running, or (2) through ownership of an estate (personal property or mixed personal and real property)
of a certain value for five years running, or simply (3) through residence
for ten years together with tax paying for five years. Only the first method
required ownership of real property.

An American citizen could gain a town settlement under this statute
without ever having owned real property. It is true that aliens were legally
precluded from owning real property in Massachusetts, but they were not

legally precluded from owning personal property or from paying taxes.
They were in a legal position to demonstrate economic capacity under two
of the three methods set out in the statute, but the statute expressly disqualified noncitizens from doing so.
On its face the statute treated noncitizens differently from citizens and
it strikes me that a less labored reading of the statute would be that it flatly

precluded noncitizens from becoming members of Massachusetts town
communities even if they could demonstrate economic capacity, a clear
example of citizenship as refusal. This reading is strongly supported by
what we know about the debates over alienage and naturalization that were
taking place in the 1790s and about the posture of the Massachusetts legislature toward aliens during this period.

Parker's reading of the 1794 statute, moreover, depends upon the fact
that aliens were prohibited from owning real property in Massachusetts.
But that raises the question why aliens were prohibited from owning real
property in the state in the first place? Why was this disability itself not
evidence of citizenship as a gesture of refusal? Parker seems to see the real
property disability as a matter of pure tradition going back to English law,
a tradition that had merely lingered on in Massachusetts. But the evidence
suggests that the alien real property disability became a live issue after the
Revolution. A number of states repealed the disability, hoping to encourage immigration; Massachusetts did not. This was no mere lingering on of
tradition, it was conscious post-Revolutionary Massachusetts policy aimed
at protecting the Commonwealth from the undue influence of aliens.
The difficulty with the main argument of this article, it seems to me, is
that where it looks for citizenship as refusal in the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, the explicit gestures of refusal it finds are not substantially different from gestures of refusal that Massachusetts and other colo-
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nies had engaged in, on and off, for more than a century and that they had

long justified on the ground that aliens (at least some aliens) were other.
The Massachusetts policy of these decades seems to have represented the
culmination of an older tradition of using citizenship/subjectship as refusal rather than the beginning of a new one. And at times this older tradition
had produced even harsher gestures of refusal than those that were to be
found in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. I take the Massachusetts real property disability and the settlement act of 1794 to represent
examples of this older tradition at its worst. Not until the last quarter of
the nineteenth century did the regulation of immigration begin to take on
a new, even harsher, more comprehensive form, one that would lead in the
twentieth century to the thoroughgoing territorialization of the nation.
Parker's real contribution is to lay bare some of the pressures that were
responsible during the first decades of the nineteenth century for driving
regulation of the poor upward, for leading the state to take away from the
localities the administration of certain important aspects of poor relief and
immigration policy. By contrast, the substantive policies that the state be-

gan to administer during this period do not seem to have represented a
marked departure from policies that had been utilized, intermittently, to
manage immigration for over a century.

